Retrospective Legislation

In a recent Borderlines episode, Garth Barriere, Eric Purtzki, Peter Edelmann and I discussed the constitutionality of laws that are retroactive or retrospective.  This episode can be found here:

A link to this episode’s synopsis can be found here.

The following post provides a more detailed written summary of retroactive and retrospective legislation in the immigration context.

Continue reading “Retrospective Legislation”


Personalized vs. Generalized Risk

From the Big Picture

As the political situations in several Latin American countries worsens, there has been a steady increase in the number of refugee cases being decided on the issue of personalized vs. generalized risk.

Section 97(1)(b)(ii) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act states that a person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to another country would subject them personally to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country.

The Federal Court has grappled with how to distinguish between personalized and generalized risk.

Proophete

As noted in Prophète v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 331, the difficulty in analyzing personalized risk in situations of generalized human rights violations, civil war, and failed states lies in determining the dividing line between a risk that is “personalized” and one that is “general”.  What, for example, is the risk to an individual who has been targeted in the past and who may be targeted in the future but whose risk situation is similar to a segment of the larger population?  In Prophète, for example, Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer, after much deliberation, determined that s. 97 can be interpreted to include a sub-group within the larger one that faces an even more acute risk.

Definition of Generliazed

Further complicating the issue is that there are varying definitions of what the word “generalized” means.  In Osorio v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1459, Justice Snider reiterated that there is nothing which requires the Immigration and Refugee Board to interpret the word “generally” as applying to all citizens.  She added: “The word ‘generally’ is commonly used to mean ‘prevalent’ or ‘widespread’. Parliament deliberately chose to include the word ‘generally’ in subsection 97(1)(b)(ii), thereby leaving to the Board the issue of deciding whether a particular group meets the definition. Provided that its conclusion is reasonable, as it is here, I see no need to intervene.

In Baires Sanchez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Crampton further tightened the screws when he stated that in order to show that a risk is not generalized applicants must establish that the risk of actual or threatened similar violence is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country, and that applicants must demonstrate that the respective risks that they face are not prevalent or widespread in their respective countries of origin, in the sense of being a risk faced by a significant subset of the population.

A good example of this principle can be found in Duarte v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 500.  There, the Federal Court found that unique ineptitude can constitute a form of personalized risk.

Currently, one of the leading case on the matter is Portillo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 678. There, the Federal Court articulated a two-step test for determining generalized vs. personalized test. The Refugee Protection Division (the “RPD“) must first appropriately determine the nature of the risk faced by the claimant which requires an assessment of whether the claimant faces an ongoing or future risk, what that risk is, whether it is one of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and the basis for the risk. Second, the correctly described risk faced by the claimant must then be compared to that faced by a significant group in the country at issue to determine whether the risks are of the same nature and degree.  As well, it will typically be the case that where an individual is subject to a personal risk to his life or risks cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, then that risk is no longer general.

 

 


Immigration Detainees Granted Access to Habeas Corpus

On October 20, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “ONCA”) released its decision in Chaudhary v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (“Chaudhary”).  The ONCA has ruled that the immigration detention review system provided for in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) does not provide an effective forum for detainees to challenge their continued detention. Effective immediately, detainees will be able to apply to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for habeas corpus to challenge their continued detentions.

Habeas Corpus

Habeas Corpus, latin for “you shall have the body,” is a recourse in law whereby a detained individual can apply to a court for a determination on whether their detention or imprisonment is unlawful.  If the court rules that the detaining entity is acting beyond its authority, then it must release the detainee.   Habeas Corpus is commonly regarded as a cornerstone of liberty.  It is enshrined by s. 10(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms, which provides that “everyone has the right on arrest or detention to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.

Under what is known as the “Peiroo exception,” the Supreme Court of Canada in May v. Ferndale Institution stated that in immigration matters habeas corpus is precluded where federal legislation provides a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme which contains a review process that is at least as broad as and no less advantageous than habeas corpus.

The ONCA in Chaudhary determined that the immigration detention review system provided for in the IRPA does not meet these requirements.

Canada’s Immigration Detention System

The IRPA contains a comprehensive scheme for detention review.  To detain someone there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is inadmissible to Canada and is a danger to the public, or is unlikely to appear for a future interview, an admissibility hearing, removal, or a proceeding that could lead to a removal order.  Detention may also be ordered if the authorities are not satisfied as to the identity of the individual.  Finally, a permanent resident or foreign national can be detained when they are entering Canada if an immigration officer considers it necessary to do so for the examination of the individual to be completed, or if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual is inadmissible to Canada on grounds of security, violation of human rights,  or criminality.

After a person is detained, the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board will automatically review their detention.  The Immigration Division must hold its first detention review within 48 hours after the individual has been detained, or without delay afterwards.  If continued detention is ordered, then the Immigration Division must then conduct a second review of the reasons for continued detention within seven days of the first review.  If it then orders continued detention, it must review the reasons for continued detention at least once during each 30-day period following each previous detention review.

The Immigration Division must order that a detainee be released unless the Immigration Division is satisfied that:

  • the detainee is a danger to the public,
  • the detainee unlikely to appear for further examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order;
  • the government is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that the detainee is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, or criminality; or
  • the government believes that the detainee’s identity has not been, but may be, established, and the detainee has not reasonably cooperated with the government to help it establish his/her identity.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (“IRPR”) further provide that if one of the above grounds for continued detention is identified, then before ordering continued detention the Immigration Division must also consider:

  • the reason for detention;
  • the length of time in detention;
  • whether there are any elements that can assist in determining the length of time that detention is likely to continue and, if so, that length of time;
  • any unexplained delays or unexplained lack of diligence caused by the government or the person concerned; and
  • the existence of alternatives to detention.

A detainee can apply for leave to the Federal Court for judicial review of the Immigration Division’s decisions on continued detention.  The Federal Court will only consider whether the Immigration Division’s decision was reasonable based on the information before it, or whether there was a breach of procedural fairness.  The Federal Court will be very deferential to the Division.

The ONCA found the IRPA detention review scheme lacking for several reasons, including that the federal legislation provides that the length of detention is but one factor to be considered,  that continued detention can often be justified simply by relying on the reasons given at prior detention proceedings (as the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed in Thanabalasingham), and that neither the Immigration Division nor the courts are tasked with the question of determining whether the detention violates the Charter or other human rights principles, and rarely do.

As a result, the ONCA ruled that immigration detainees will now have access to habeas corpus.

The Habeas Corpus Alternative

If a detainee wishes to challenge their continued detention in superior or provincial court, the test will be much different from the one contained in IRPA.  As the ONCA stated (modified for ease of reading and clarity):

On their habeas corpus applications, the [detainees] would have to show that reasonable and probable grounds exist for their complaints [to the court that their continued detention has become unconstitutional]. The grounds will be the exceptional length of their detentions and their uncertain continued duration. The question the court will then have to address is whether, because of their length and the uncertainty as to their continued duration, the detentions have become illegal, in violation of the detainees’ ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights [which provide for the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and the right to not be arbitrarily detained] and international instruments to which Canada is a signatory. A detention cannot be justified if it is no longer reasonably necessary to further the machinery of immigration control. Where there is no reasonable prospect that the detention’s immigration-related purposes will be achieved within a reasonable time (with what is reasonable depending on the circumstances), a continued detention will violate the detainee’s ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights and no longer be legal. In responding to the application, the Minister must satisfy a court that, despite its length and uncertain duration, the continued detention is still justified.

Habeas corpus is non-discretionary.  There is no requirement that leave be obtained.  As well, unlike with a judicial review where the applicant must show that the Immigration Division made an error, on an application for habeas corprus the legal burden rests with the detaining authorities once the detainee has established a deprivation of liberty and raised a legitimate ground upon which to challenge its legality.

Depending on the province, a hearing on a habeas corpus application in a superior court will likely obtained more rapidly than a federal court judicial review.

 

Habeas Corpus and House Arrest

In Wang et al. v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 2841 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice answered the question of whether habeas corpus applied to individuals under house arrest. It found that it did not, stating that:

Upon request by an applicant, the Immigration Division may order the applicant’s release on any terms or conditions that the Immigration Division considers necessary, which would include house arrest.  When the applicants in the case before me were released from custody on terms and conditions that included house arrest, they were no longer detained for the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus.

The Federal Court Addresses Chaudhary

In Warssama v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)Justice Harrington issued a strongly worded decision in which he ordered that the Immigration Division consider alternatives to detention if the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA“) could not explain why an individual could not be removed to Somalia.  It is likely that he had Chaudhary in mind, considering how often he references it throughout the decision.  Indeed, contrary to what the ONCA wrote in Chaudhary, he implied that the Federal Court could hear Habeas Corpus, without explicitly ruling so.

It seems somewhat peculiar that the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to members of the Armed Forces serving outside Canada, but otherwise cannot issue a writ of habeas corpus at all, notwithstanding that it is dealing with detention in immigration and penitentiary matters day in and day out.

Perhaps the last word has yet to be written, either by the courts or by Parliament.

Indeed, considering that Justice Harrington stopped short of explicitly stating that the Federal Court could hear habeas corpus applications, the last word will have to be written elsewhere.


When an Administrative Delay is an Abuse of Process

The subject of an unreasonable delay often arises in the immigration context.  In one case that I was previously involved with, an individual was in Canada for 11-years before the Canada Border Services Agency expressed concerns that he might be inadmissible to Canada for previous involvement in a group accused of terrorism.  In another case, an individual who had been in and out of Canada numerous times was suddenly denied entry to Canada because of a criminal conviction that occurred eight years ago.  In both cases, the client asked whether the delay amounted to an abuse of process.

Blencoe v. British Columbia

The leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on this issue is Blencoe v. British Columbia, 2000 SCC 44.  There, three women filed complaints of sexual harassment to the British Columbia Human Rights Council.  Due to delays the tribunal hearings were not resolved for 30 months after the first filing.  The accused challenged that the 30 month delay was an abuse of process, an argument which the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately rejected, and also found that the Charter was not engaged.  Importantly, the Supreme Court found that a state caused delay, without more, does not warrant a stay as an abuse of process at common law, and that there must be significant prejudice to the individual as a result of the delay.

The following principles emerged from Blencoe:

  • The administrative process must be conducted in a manner entirely consistent with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
  • Unreasonable delay is a possible basis on which to raise questions of natural justice, procedural fairness, abuse of process and abuse of discretion.
  • Delay, without more, will not warrant a stay of proceedings as an abuse of process.
  • Administrative delay may impugn the validity of the proceedings where it impairs a party’s ability to answer the complaint against him or her – where memories have faded, essential witnesses are unavailable, or evidence has been lost.
  • Where the fairness of the hearing has not been compromised, delay may nevertheless amount to an abuse of process, but few lengthy delays will meet this threshold.
  • The court must be satisfied that, “the damage to the public interest in the fairness of the administrative process should the proceeding go ahead would exceed the harm to the public interest in the enforcement of the legislation if the proceedings were halted.
  • If the delay has directly caused significant psychological harm to a person, or attached a stigma to a person’s reputation, such that the [administrative] system would be brought into disrepute, such prejudice may be sufficient to constitute an abuse of process.
  • Determination of whether the delay is unreasonable is, in part, a relative exercise in which one compares the length of delay in the case at bar with the length of time normally taken for processing in the same jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions in Canada.

Unreasonable Delays Immigration Context

Beltran v. Canada (2011 FC 516) provides an example of the application of Blencoe in the immigration context.  There, the Canadian Security Intelligence Services determined that an individual was not a threat to Canada’s national interest.  Fourteen years later, without any explanation, and without any explanation, a new security officer expressed concerns, causing further delays in inadmissibility proceedings being commenced.  The court also found that a new investigation caused undue prejudice to Mr. Blencoe.  The Court was also critical of the government’s decision not to reveal certain information that it had kept confidential for twenty years, only to use it later.

In Torre v Canada ( Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 591, the applicant was a permanent resident in Canada, arrested for drug trafficking in 1996. Seventeen years later, in 2013, two inadmissibility reports were prepared and referred to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing, which could lead to his removal. The Immigration Division refused to hear the applicant’s motion for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

Upon judicial review, the Federal Court found that the Immigration Division has little discretion to determine whether there was an abuse of process because the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and jurisprudence provide that the Immigration Division hold an admissibility hearing quickly, and if it finds the person inadmissible, it must make a removal order.

S. 11(b) of the Charter

Section 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time. The Federal Court has ruled, however, that this does not apply to immigration proceedings, and in Montoya v. Canada even ruled that it does not apply to citizenship revocation.


Procedural Fairness Where Credibility is an Issue

In any application to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (“IRCC“), the burden is on the applicant to put forward a complete, convincing and unambiguous application which provides sufficient evidence to establish that the requirements of Canadian immigration legislation have been met.  Visa officers are under no obligation to ask for additional information where the submitted material is insufficient.   However, where there is a concern regarding the credibility or the genuineness of the evidence submitted, as opposed to the sufficiency of or weight to be given to that information, then the duty of fairness generally requires that the applicant be given the opportunity to address the concern.

In Farooq v. Canada, 2013 FC 164 (“Farooq“), for example, IRCC’s refusal letter stated:

He claims he worked from January 2005 to August 2006 as software developer and from 2006 to present as manager (software development) for Tricastmedia PVT Ltd in Lahore Pakistan. Such rapid promotion is not credible as computer and information systems managers normally require several years of experience in systems analysis, data administration software engineering, network design or computer programming, including supervisory experience. Some of the duties in his employment letter repeat verbatim the duties of NOC 0213 which raises the question of the credibility of that employment letter. The other duties are similar to those of information systems analysts and consultants (NOC Code 2171).

Although the NOC Code 0213 corresponds to an occupation specified in the instructions, the information submitted to support this application is insufficient to substantiate that applicant meets the occupational description and/or a substantial number of the main duties of NOC 0213.

Justice Roy’s reasons in determining that the failure of the visa officer to provide the applicant with an opportunity to respond to his concerns about credibility provide a comprehensive summary of the law on this issue, and I have reproduced them in full:

Justice O’Keefe was confronted to the same kind of situation in the case of Patelsupra. (“Patel“) Paragraphs 24 to 27 seem to me to apply squarely to the situation at hand. They read:

Regulation 75 clearly indicates that a foreign national is only a skilled worker if he can show one year of full time employment where he performed the actions in the lead statement of the NOC and a substantial number of the main duties.

As such, if the visa officer was concerned only that the employment letter was insufficient proof that the principal applicant met the requirements of Regulation 75, then she would not have been required to conduct an interview.

However, the officer states that her concern is that the duties in the employment letter have been copied directly from the NOC description and that the duties in the experience letter are identical to the letter of employment. I agree with the principal applicant that the officer’s reasons are inadequate to explain why this was problematic. I find that the implication from these concerns is that the officer considered the experience letter to be fraudulent.

Consequently, by viewing the letter as fraudulent, the officer ought to have convoked an interview of the principal applicant based on the jurisprudence above. As such, the officer denied the principal applicant procedural fairness and the judicial review must be allowed.

The narrow issue that needs to be decided here is whether or not this is a case regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, in the sense that, in the words of Justice Richard Mosley in Hassani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1283, [2007] 3 FCR 501:

… there is no obligation on the part of the visa officer to apprise an applicant of her concerns that arise directly from the requirements of the former Act or Regulations …

It is also certainly true that a visa officer does not have an obligation to provide a “running score” of the weaknesses in an application. However, where the issue is credibility, “the duty of fairness may require immigration officials to inform applicants of their concerns with applications so that an applicant may have a chance to “disabuse” an officer of such concerns, even where such concerns arise from evidence tendered by the applicant” (Rukmangathan, above, at paragraph 22). Justice de Montigny, in Talpursupra, finding support inHassani, summarized clearly what I believe is the state of the law:

It is by now well established that the duty of fairness, even if it is at the low end of the spectrum in the context of visa applications … require visa officers to inform applicants of their concerns so that an applicant may have an opportunity to disabuse an officer of such concerns. This will be the case, in particular, where such concern arises not so much from the legal requirements but from the authenticity or credibility of the evidence provided by the applicant.

Here, the visa officer indicates clearly that the credibility of the applicant, or lack thereof, is the fundamental concern he has. Contrary to other cases where an opportunity is given to the applicant to address the concerns, there is nothing of the sort in this case. It would seem to me that both Patel and Rukmangathanare dispositive of the issue and that the matter should be remitted to a different visa officer for the purpose of a re-determination of the matter.

Another example of this principle can be found in Madadi v. Canada, 2013 FC 176.  There, in determining that an applicant did not perform a substantial number of the Main Duties in NOC 0711, IRCC did not consider any duties in the applicant’s confirmation of employment which either copied the NOC descriptions or closely paraphrased them.  After not considering those job duties, the officer found that the applicant did not perform a substantial number of the duties listed in NOC 0711.  The Court determined that procedural fairness was breached, because the visa officer’s concerns related to the genuineness of the confirmation of employment.

Examining Whether Credibility is an Issue

When reviewing refusal reasons it is important to examine whether credibility may have been an issue leading to refusal.

Sometimes it is obvious.  For example, in Azizian v. Canada, a visa officer wrote:

 Given the availability of the information [about the CBI], I found it difficult to believe that the applicant has never heard of these concerns during his employment at CBI and since retiring… I do not find credible that the applicant would have not been involved in policy decision making and decisions concerning allocation of funds, especially since the PA held the position of Secretary General of the bank and because he indicated in his affidavit that his duty in 2003-2009 was to develop and supervise the implementation of the by-laws and guidelines for the Iranian banking system.

This was found to clearly be a credibility concern.

Credibility assessments are often implicit, however, rather than explicit. In Khodchenko v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), IRCC’s refusal reasons in part stated that:

REVIEWED INFO SUBMITTED FOR THE FILE. PI’S EXPENCES WILL BE PAID BY MR. NAZAREVICH – FAMILY FRIEND. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY HE WOULD PAY SUCH AMOUNT OF MONEY FOR PI. NOT SATISFIED PI IS FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP. TIES TO UKRAINE ARE WEAK. REFUSED. (sic) [emphasis added]

The Federal Court found that the officer made a veiled credibility assessment of the benefactor and the applicant in questioning that the employment arrangement was what the applicants said it was, and that the officer accordingly owed a duty of fairness to the applicant to put his concerns directly and explicitly and give her an opportunity to respond.

In Rani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), meanwhile, Madam Justice Strickland found that a visa officer’s  statement that “evidence of [the applicant’s] involvement with spouse’s business comes only from her own statements and that of her supporting relative in Canada. It is therefore not clear to what extent the context of English language use…could be considered familiar” to also be an implicit credibility assessment, and ordered the matter re-decided.

Another Helpful Summary of this Principle

Bajwa v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship) contains another helpful summary of the distinction between credibility and insufficient evidence. There, Justice Russel wrote:

These words give rise to a familiar dispute in the jurisprudence as to whether the Visa Officer is questioning the credibility of the Applicants or simply deciding that the evidence is not sufficient to support the criteria that must be established in order to qualify for the status applied for. Justice Kane provided a summary of the Court’s approach to this issue in Ansari v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 849:

If the concern is truly about credibility, the case law has established that a duty of procedural fairness may arise [Hassani]. However, if the concern is about the sufficiency of evidence, given that the applicant is clearly directed to provide a complete application with supporting documents, no such duty arises. Distinguishing between concerns about sufficiency of evidence and credibility is not a simple task as both issues may be related.

The case law has established that each case must be assessed to determine if the concern does in fact relate to credibility. In several of the cases referred to, although the duties were copied or paraphrased from the NOC, there were additional factors confirming that the concern of the officer was about the authenticity or veracity of the document or the credibility of the author of the document. Simply using the term credibility is not determinative of whether the concern is about credibility, though the use of the term cannot be ignored.

Applicants often find it very difficult to understand this distinction. They reason that if their own representations are not accepted then they are not believed, so the officer concerned must be questioning their credibility and this requires an interview or an adequate opportunity to address credibility on grounds of procedural fairness.

I think the issue is best explained in lay terms by recognizing that applicants have a double obligation. First of all, they are under a duty of candor to tell the truth and not to conceal relevant facts. If an officer suspects that the duty of candour is not being met, then he or she must put the matter to the applicant and provide a reasonable opportunity – either in writing or in person – for the applicant to address the officer’s concerns. Where misrepresentation or breach of the duty of candor is the issue, then an application is usually refused on the basis of misrepresentation and s 40 of the Act.

But applicants also have an obligation – over and above the duty of candor – to support their applications with documentation that confirms their positions. Documentation is required by the legislation in all applications and a failure to provide adequate documentation can result in a refusal that is not based upon credibility. If this were not the case, then all applications would have to be accepted upon their own unsupported assertions. There will be situations where documentation is not available and the Act makes adequate allowances for this. Applicants are permitted to explain why they cannot provide documents that are required and/or expected in their particular situations.

In the present case, the treatment of the two letters from Mr. Singh has to be read in the context of the Decision as a whole in order to determine what the Visa Officer means by “satisfied.” Does she mean that the evidence is inadequate to support the application or does she mean that she questions the veracity of that evidence when she says that “I am not satisfied that the client is a bona fide worker under R 205 (D) or will leave after her authorized stay.”

In all work permit applications and extension applications, the officer has to decide on the evidence whether the applicant is likely to leave at the end of the period requested. And interviews and/or fairness letters are not required in most situations. As the Respondent points out, it is generally not a procedural fairness requirement that work permit applicants be granted an opportunity to respond to the concerns of officers. However, there have been situations in the context of work permit applications where officers have been required for reasons of procedural fairness to seek further clarification for credibility concerns in particular.

In Hamza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 264, the application was rejected on the basis that the work experience letter mirrored the job duties of the NOC description, which the visa officer described as “self-serving.” Justice Bédard found that by stating the letter was self-serving, the officer was saying that he or she doubted the veracity of its content. It was thus distinguished from Kaur, above, because the applicant had provided sufficient evidence and a duty to provide the applicant an opportunity to respond was found. The decision quoted Justice Snider in Perez Enriquez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1091:

The first duty raised by the Applicant is the duty to seek clarification. When an Applicant puts his or her best foot forward by submitting complete evidence and a visa officer doubts that evidence, the officer has a duty to seek clarification (Sandhu, above at paras 32-33). Although this duty is not triggered in situations where an applicant simply presents insufficient evidence, it will arise if the officer entertains concerns regarding the veracity of evidence; for example, if the officer questions the credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of the information provided (Olorunshola, above at paras 32-35). On the facts of this case, a duty to clarify may have arisen but was discharged by the Officer’s questions to the Applicant during the interview. There was no breach of fairness.

The second duty raised by the Applicant is a duty to provide an opportunity to respond. When an applicant submits information that, if accepted, supports the application, he or she should be given an opportunity to respond to the officer’s concerns if the officer wishes to make a decision based on those concerns (Kumar, above at paras 30-31). Procedural fairness may require an interview; for example, if a visa officer believes an applicant’s documents may be fraudulent (Patel, above at paras 24-27). (…)

(some references omitted)

Justice Zinn’s decision in Madadi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 716 at para 6 provides a succinct summary:

The jurisprudence of this Court on procedural fairness in this area is clear: Where an applicant provides evidence sufficient to establish that they meet the requirements of the Act or regulations, as the case may be, and the officer doubts the “credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of the information provided” and wishes to deny the application based on those concerns, the duty of fairness is invoked[.]

(references omitted)


Excessive Demand on Health and Social Services

People applying for a Canadian permanent resident visa are regarded to undergo medical examinations. Many people with certain conditions are understandably apprehensive about how these examinations will impact their ability to immigrate. In this post, I hope to provide an overview about the issue of “excessive demand on health or social services,” which is probably the medical evaluation component that causes the most misconceptions.
Continue reading →



Genuineness and Primary Purpose – The Disjunctive Test – Section 4(1) of the Regulations

Regulation 4(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (“IRPR“) state that:

4. (1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal partnership

(a) was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act; or

(b) is not genuine.

There has been developing jurisprudence on the disjunctive nature of IRPR r. 4(1), including a recent Federal Court certified question on whether IRPR 4(1)(a) is ultra vires the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA“), which provides that:

The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are to see that families are reunited in Canada.

Continue reading “Genuineness and Primary Purpose – The Disjunctive Test – Section 4(1) of the Regulations”