Arguing Incompetence of Counsel in an Appeal

Many lawyers when they meet with clients often find themselves reviewing rejected applications and/or hearings where it is obvious that an individual’s previous representative was incompetent.  The examples of incompetence range from missed deadlines to not understanding the law.  Some specific scenarios that clients have told me about include:

  • former counsel being told by an Immigration Appeal Division member to “sit down” because they were incompetent;
  • an immigration consultant not knowing the difference between a “conviction” and a “dismissal”;
  • an immigration consultant that the “Prevailing Wage = the wage paid to Canadians at the employer’s company”; and
  • a lawyer filing late because “deadlines are policy, not statute.”

The previous representative’s incompetence may serve as a ground for relief in a judicial review.  However, cases based on incompetence and/or negligence of previous counsel are exceptionally difficult cases.  The Federal Court’s March 7, 2014, Procedural Protocol on arguing incompetence of counsel only make these cases more challenging.   

The Law on Incompetence of Counsel

As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R v. GDB for incompetence/negligence of previous counsel/representative to count as a ground for judicial review, it must be established that (1) previous counsel’s acts or omissions constituted incompetence and (2) that a miscarriage of justice resulted from the incompetence.

The Federal Court has closely followed the above two requirements when determining whether an alleged incompetence is a ground for review.  In the frequently cited case of Memari v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Court stated that:

…the performance component must be exceptional and the miscarriage of justice component must be manifested in procedural unfairness, the reliability of the trial result having been compromised, or another readily apparent form.

In Galyas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Russell stated that it is generally recognized that if an applicant wishes to establish a breach of fairness on this ground, he or she must:

a. Provide corroboration by giving notice to former counsel and providing them with an opportunity to respond;

b. Establish that former counsel’s act or omission constituted incompetence without the benefit and wisdom of hindsight; and

c. Establish that the outcome would have been different but for the incompetence.

In the often cited case of Shirwa v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 FC 51, the Federal Court explained that there must be sufficient evidence to establish the “exact dimensions of the problem.”  Where the incompetence or negligence of an applicant’s representative is sufficiently specific and clearly supported by the evidence, such negligence or incompetence is inherently prejudicial to an applicant.  For example, in Kim v. Canada, 2012 FC 687, the Federal Court held that where an officer specifically refers to the lack of evidence, and where the submissions by a consultant are limited, then the failure to submit evidence causes a prejudice to the Applicants amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

Over time, as it began to become apparent that many allegations of previous counsel’s incompetence/negligence may have been factually inaccurate the Federal Court began to develop jurisprudence that current counsel could only argue incompetence/negligence of previous counsel/representative if there was evidence that either a complaint had been filed with the previous counsel’s/representative’s licensing body, or that the current counsel notified the previous counsel/representative of an intention to make an incompetence argument.  The March 7, 2014, Procedural Protocol affirms this jurisprudence, and makes it mandatory.

March 7, 2014 Procedural Protocol

The March 7, 2014, Procedural Protocol describes the procedure that counsel must follow where an applicant alleges professional incompetence, negligence, or other conduct against an applicant’s former legal counsel, or other authorized representative, which includes consultants, within the context of an application for leave and judicial review.

To paraphrase the Procedural Protocol (which I have embedded below), the procedure is:

  1. Prior to pleading incompetence, negligence or other conduct by the former counsel/representative as a grounds for relief, current counsel must satisfy him/herself, by means of personal investigations or inquiries, that there is some factual foundation for this allegation. In addition, current counsel must notify the former counsel/representative in writing with sufficient details of the allegations and advise that the matter will be pled in an application described above. The written notice must advise the former counsel/representative that they have seven days from receipt of the notice to respond, and include a copy of the Procedural Protocol.  In cases where privilege may be applicable, current counsel must provide the former counsel/representative with a signed authorization from the applicant releasing any privilege attached to the former representation.
  2. Current counsel should, unless there is urgency, wait for a written response from the former counsel/representative before filing and serving the application record. If the former counsel/representative intends to respond he or she must do so, in writing to current counsel, within seven days of receipt of the notice from current counsel.
  3. If after reviewing the response of the former counsel/representative, current counsel believes that there may be merit to the allegations, current counsel may file the application or appeal record. Any perfected application which raises allegations against the former counsel/representative must be served on the former counsel/representative and proof of service be provided to the Court.
  4.  Where  it becomes apparent that current counsel’s pursuit of this investigation may delay the perfection of the application record or appeal record beyond the timelines provided for by the Rules, then current counsel may apply by motion for an extension of time to perfect the record.
  5. If the former counsel or authorized representative wishes to respond to the allegations made in the record, he or she may do so in writing by sending a written response to current counsel and to counsel for the government within ten days of service of the application or appeal record or such further time as the Federal Court may direct.
  6. Current counsel who wishes to respond to the communication received from the former counsel/representative must file a motion for an extension of time and for leave to file further written submissions with respect to the new material received.
  7. If no response from the former counse /representative is received within ten days of service, and no extension of time has been granted, current counsel must advise the Court and the lawyers for the government that no further information from the former counsel/representative is being submitted and the Court shall base its decision without any further notification to the former counsel/representative.

While the Procedural Protocol adds several new mandatory steps to Applications for Leave to Commence Judicial Review involving allegations of incompetence/negligence, it also removes uncertainty involving such applications.  As well, if the Procedural Protocol results in the Federal Court removing the previously developing requirement that current counsel file a complaint with the previous counsel’s/representative’s licensing body, then there may actually be less steps, and time consumed, in these applications.


Espionage and Immigrating to Canada

Section 34(1) of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides, amongst other things, that a foreign national or Canadian permanent resident is inadmissible to Canada for engaging in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests, or being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in espionage against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests.  It is one of the most serious inadmissibilities in Canadian immigration law.

Guidelines

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s (“IRCC”) Enforcement Manual 2 – Inadmissibilities contains the following definitions and guidance to officers regarding how immigration officials are to determine whether someone is inadmisisble to Canada for espionage.

Espionage is defined as a method of information gathering by spying; that is, the gathering of information in a surreptitious manner, secretly seeking out information usually from a hostile country to benefit one’s own country.

Paragraph A34(1)(a) contains two possible allegations that could render a permanent resident or foreign national inadmissible to Canada for acts of espionage:

1. if the act of espionage is against Canada, or

2. if the act of espionage is contrary to Canada’s interests.

Espionage “against Canada” means espionage activities conducted by a foreign state or organization in Canada and/or abroad against any Canadian public or private sector entity on behalf of a foreign government. It may also include activities of a foreign nonstate organization against the Government of Canada, but does not include acts of industrial spying between private entities where no government is involved.

The following is a non-exhaustive list of activities that may constitute espionage that is “contrary to Canada’s interests”:

 Espionage activity committed inside or outside Canada that would have a negative impact on the safety, security or prosperity of Canada. Prosperity of Canada includes but is not limited to the following factors: financial, economic, social, and cultural.

 The espionage activity does not need to be against the state. It could also be against Canadian commercial or other private interests.

 The use of Canadian territory to carry out espionage activities may be contrary to Canada’s national security and public safety and therefore contrary to Canada’s interests.

 Espionage activity directed against Canada’s allies as it may also be contrary to Canada’s interests.

Note: These guidelines are intented to be dynamic as the concept of what is contrary to Canada’s interest may evolve or change over time.

Spying on Campus Organizations, Churches, Schools, etc. 

Qu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) is the leading Federal Court of Appeal decision regarding what constitutes espionage under Canadian immigration legislation.

Mr. Qu was a citizen of the People’s Republic of China studying at Concordia University in Montreal.  He was active in the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, a campus group, and regularly reported on that group’s activities to officials at the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa.  The Federal Court of Appeal had to determine whether spying on a campus organization, as opposed to a formal institution of democratic government or process, constituted espionage under Canadian immigration legislation.

The Federal Court of Appeal determined that it did, and that the definition of espionage should be interpreted broadly, and that the ability of individuals to freely belong to associations was integral to the democratic process in Canada. The Court went on to state that:

In Canada, a democratic institution is not limited to a political institution, it includes organized groups who seek through democratic means to influence government policies and decisions.

Canada is a pluralistic society with a variety of autonomous organizations independent of the government and to one and other.

As a free and democratic society, Canada values and protects democratic non-governmental institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.

The Federal Court of Appeal accordingly went on to note that an individual could be inadmissible to Canada for espionage if they engaged in spying against an organization that was engaged in lawful activities in Canada of a political, religious, social or economic nature, and as such that this was not limited to trade unions, professional associations and political parties.

Intelligence Gathering vs. Espionage

In Peer v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal Court had to answer the following certified question:

Is a person inadmissible to Canada for “engaging in an act of espionage… against a democratic government, institution or process” within the meaning of subsection section 34(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, if the person’s activities consist of intelligence gathering activities that are legal in the country where they take place, do not violate international law and where there is no evidence of hostile intent against the persons who are being observed?

Mr. Peer was a member of Pakistan’s Corps of Military Intelligence and its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.  They would monitor individuals, including those from democratic countries, when they were in Pakistan.  Mr. Peer argued that his gathering of intelligence on the activities of foreign nationals was simply intelligence gathering and as it was on domestic soil did not constitute espionage against Canada.

Both the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal disagreed. While the Federal Court of Appeal did not provide any reasoning, Justice Zinn at the Federal Court level wrote:

I have no doubt that many centuries ago one could not easily engage in espionage unless one travelled to a foreign land to gather the relevant information because there was no other way the information could be obtained.  That is quite simply not the case now, if it ever was.  If I were to accept the submission of the applicant that one cannot engage in espionage while remaining in one’s own country, I would have to accept that intelligence agents who monitor telephone and internet communications from the safety of their country are engaged only in “intelligence gathering” and not in espionage, even when the information they gather relates to sensitive state secrets.

The applicant might suggest that those agents are engaged in an illegal activity and thus fall outside his proposed definition of espionage.  However, while the interception of these communications may be an offence in the country from whence the communications originate, I have no doubt that the actions of these interceptors will be perfectly legal and, in fact, are sanctioned in their own country.

….

What matters in this case is the applicant’s surreptitious gathering of information, or spying, on foreign nationals in Pakistan.  The applicant’s motive or his location when doing this spying is entirely irrelevant in determining that his activities on behalf of Pakistan intelligence constituted “espionage.”


US War Deserters – Immigrating to Canada

Being a war deserter does not in of itself mean that either a refugee claim or an application for permanent residency based on humanitarian & compassionate (“H&C“) grounds will succeed.

On July 6, 2010,the Federal Court of Appeal (the “FCA“) released its decision in Hinzman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FCA 177 (“Hinzman“)

Hinzman involved an American soldier who for moral and religious beliefs was against “all participation in war.”  In 2004, upon learning that his unit would be deployed to Iraq, Mr. Hinzman fled the United States for Canada. He was AWOL from the US army since his arrival in Canada.  He originally claimed refugee status, a claim which was unsuccessful.

Mr. Hinzman then filed a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (“PRRA“) and an application for permanent residence based on H&C grounds.

A Citizenship and Immigration Canada officer (the “Officer“) rejected the PRRA.  She found that:

[t]he possibility of prosecution under a law of general application is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. The PRRA application is not an avenue to circumvent lawful and legitimate prosecutions commenced by a democratic country.

Mr. Hinzman did not seek leave to apply for judicial review of the PRRA decision.

The Officer also rejected the H&C application.  Mr. Hinzman sought leave to appeal of this decision.  The Federal Court upheld the Appellant’s decision. However, it certified the following question:

Can punishment under a law of general application for desertion, when the desertion was motivated by a sincere an deeply held moral, political and/or religious objection to a particular war, amount to unusual, undeserved or disproportionate hardship in the context of an application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds?

PRRA and H&C Applications Require Different Tests

The FCA answered the question in the affirmative. It is important to note that it did not rule that H&C would always be appropriate for war deserters, nor did it state that Mr. Hinzman’s H&C application should be successful. Rather, the FCA found that punishment for desertion, where the desertion was motivated by a deeply held moral, political and/or religious objection, could amount to unusual, undeserved, or disproportionate hardship. The Court thus remitted the matter to a different Officer with the requirement that the new officer reevaluate the application using this criteria.

This judgment is the latest in a series of decisions reminding immigration officers that PRRA and H&C applications require different tests.

Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act requires that PRRA officers give consideration to any new, credible, relevant, and material evidence of facts that might have affected the outcome of an appellant’s refugee claim hearing had this evidence been presented, and to assess the risk to the individual if removed.

H&C applications, meanwhile, require officers to regard public policy considerations and humanitarian grounds, including family-related interests.

The Officer did not appear to consider this, instead noting with regards to the H&C application that:

It is important to note that the possibility of prosecution for a law of general application is not, in and of itself, suffiicent evidence that an applicant will face unusual and undeserved, or disporporitionate hardship. The H&C application is not an avenue to circumvent lawful and legitimate prosecutions commenced by a democratic country.

As the FCA noted, this standard of analysis is generally used for PRRA applications. It is not the test for H&C applications.

Operational Bulletin 202 – War Deserters

As a result of the Hinzman decision, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (“CIC“) released Operational Bulletin 202, which states:

This operational bulletin provides immigration officers in Canada with instructions on processing cases involving military deserters.

Background

Some individuals who may have deserted the military or who may have committed an offence equivalent to desertion of the military in their country of origin have sought refuge in Canada. Desertion is an offence in Canada under the National Defence Act (NDA). The maximum punishment for desertion under section 88 of the NDA is life imprisonment, if the person committed the offence on active service or under orders for active service. Consequently, persons who have deserted the military in their country of origin may be inadmissible to Canada under section 36(1)(b) or 36(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The current inventory of military deserter cases is comprised primarily of members of the United States armed forces who have claimed refugee protection in Canada. Desertion from the armed forces is described as an offence pursuant to section 85 of the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Many of the persons in our current case inventory have had their refugee claims heard and have subsequently applied for permanent residence in Canada based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations. Some have also applied for permanent residence in Canada as members of the spouse or common-law partner in Canada class. Others have filed Pre-removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) applications when faced with removal from Canada. These applications are at various stages of processing either in the regions or at CPC-Vegreville.

All cases which have come to the attention of the Case Management Branch (CMB) have been identified in FOSS via a non-computer based entry.

General guidelines
Processing applications for permanent residence in Canada

Given the complexity of equating either a conviction for desertion or the commission of an act constituting an offence of desertion under a foreign law with an offence under an Act of Parliament (the National Defence Act), officers are instructed to contact their Regional Program Advisor (RPA) for guidance when processing applications for permanent residence in Canada made by military deserters. Officers are also instructed to copy the Case Review Division of the CMB on their initial communication with their RPA.

Processing claims for refugee protection in Canada

Notification of all new claims for refugee protection by military deserters and any updates to these refugee claims including PRRA applications must be provided to CMB using the existing guidelines on processing high profile, contentious and sensitive cases (OP 1, section 15).

CPC-Vegreville

In accordance with current instructions with respect to cases where a personal interview or an in-depth investigation may be required, CPC-Vegreville is asked to transfer applications filed by military deserters to the appropriate inland CIC for processing.

In 2016, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada removed the reference to the United States from OB 202.

Through Access to Information Act requests we have also obtained what appear to be two internal directives to IRCC officers that will be helpful to anyone with clients whose H&C grounds are at least partially based on desertion.  They include research sources, factors that officers should consider, and possible interview questions.


Showing that the Visa Officer or IRB Member or CBSA Officer Was Biased

Many individuals think that either a visa officer, a Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) officer or an Immigration and Refugee Board member is biased against them.

This is not an argument to make lightly.

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that in order for an individual to demonstrate that a government decision maker is biased, then:

the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. [T]hat test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically — and having thought the matter through — conclude.  Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.

As well, the Supreme Court of Canada has also noted that:

Regardless of the precise words used to describe the test, the object of the different formulations is to emphasize that the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. It is a finding that must be carefully considered since it calls into question an element of judicial integrity. Indeed an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias calls into question not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice. Where reasonable grounds to make such an allegation arise, counsel must be free to fearlessly raise such allegations. Yet, this is a serious step that should not be undertaken lightly.

As the Supreme Court of Canada stated, an accusation of bias is not something that should be undertaken lightly, and in the overwhelming majority of cases the Federal Court of Canada has dismissed such accusations.  The most common accusation that individuals often make is that an individual is biased because of their race.  The Federal Court of Canada has categorically rejected such race based allegations, and held that individuals are not entitled to decide who adjudicates their matter, but can only expect that they will be treated fairly.  In my experience, the race and gender of an adjudicator is completely, and thankfully, irrelevant in Canada’s immigration system.

There are, however, instances where the Federal Court did find that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed.

In Guemache v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the allegation of bias involved the following exchanges and statements between an Immigration and Refugee Board member and an appellant:

Chairperson: I don’t put anybody in jail, I don’t condemn anyone to death, so rest assured, that’s already settled.

Chairperson: You see, I speak quite loudly – not in an attempt to intimidate you, Sir, but so that you understand me . . .

Chairperson.             Okay. And what happened?

R.             I came out to go take the bus, on my way, the distance . . . between the police station . . . the bus stop was . . . is a little bit far from . . . the police station. I was walking on my way and suddenly a car stopped, four people got out from . . . the vehicle, they came toward me, they insulted me, they hit me on the head, they told me that I was . . . what do you call it, a informant for the police.

Q.             And these people, did you know them?

A.             No.

Q.             Had you seen them before?

A.             No.

Q.             Did they say anything to you other than that you were a police informant?

A.             They said to me “You must stop doing this work.”

Q.             Did they . . .

A.             “And don’t think that we’ll . . .we’ll leave you in peace, we’ll get you.

BY THE CHAIRPERSON (addressing the claimant)

Q.             Why did . . . why didn’t they kill you right away, Sir?

A.             I don’t know, maybe I was . . . I was lucky.

. . .

BY THE COUNSELOR (addressing the Chairperson)

Q.             And can I ask a question?

A.             Yes, yes, yes.

BY THE COUNSELOR (addressing the claimant)

Q.             Why did you stay home?

BY THE CHAIRPERSON

Excellent question.

So, Sir, if you gave your passport to your brother on February 7, 8 or 10, 2002, to get a visa, can you explain to me how your brother gave this to someone, then, at some point, the visa was issued on January 28, 2002. So, if it’s a genuine visa, then, there’s like a problem, Sir. How can you give a passport to your brother without a visa on February 7, 8 or 10 and have a visa in your passport dated January 28, 2002

. . .

BY THE CHAIRPERSON (addressing the claimant)

Q.             Sir, does . . . “internal asylum” ring a bell?

The Federal Court ruled that the Member completely overstepped his boundaries, and that the applicant was denied the ability to present his case.  It described the member’s comments as  “gratuitous and uncalled for”.

In Kalkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada), a Citizenship Judge made the following comments to an individual who was requesting a language waiver:

Somebody who does not speak English or French will never be Canadian.

Tomorrow, I will grant citizenship to 800 people who all speak French or English; they all passed the test! Your lawyer has written to us that you cannot be able to learn about our country and language. Unfortunately, we receive this argument from hundreds and thousands of people.

The medical opinion on record was just an opinion of a person not as a doctor because doctors are not linguistic experts.

I am a judge and I apply the law, my first wife was Russian and my second wife was Romanian; they came as immigrants and learned.

During the hearing, I observed that you seem to understand all my questions and that you were able to converse fluently with your interpreter.

Many other people have trouble learning; some work harder at learning and some don’t and you should have learnt with the help of your husband and children.

If a negative decision is rendered, you can go to the Federal Court of Appeal and get an audition.

The Court found that this demonstrated bias, especially the reference to the Citizenship Judge’s ex-wife.

In Dena Hernandez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Martineau determined that an Immigration and Refugee Board member demonstrated bias through aggressive questioning, and also by implying that twins were not normal.

In Kalombo Kabongo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)Justice Martineau also determined that an Immigration and Refugee Board member demonstrated bias when the member acknowledged that he had pre-written a decision (which the member stressed wasn’t final) so that the member could issue the final written decision quickly.

As is hopefully shown, these examples are particularly blatant and egregious.  Most allegations of bias are unsuccessful because in almost every instance a visa officer, CBSA officer, or IRB member does do their best to maintain impartiality.

Finally, the Federal Court in Delos Santos v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) has also ruled that it is not a breach of procedural fairness for the same officer to determine both an applicant’s humanitarian & compassionate (“H&C“) application as well as an applicant’s Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (“PRRA“), and that there was no inherent bias arising from the same officer dealing with both a H&C application and a PRRA application for the same individual.

This decision was based on the Federal Court of Appeal’s (the “FCA“) decision in Oshurova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) where the FCA answered the following certified question in the negative:

Is there an appearance of bias, in this case, because the same officer decided the application for a visa exemption on humanitarian and compassionate grounds as well as the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment?



Enforcement Flag Removal Policy Change

Many people entering Canada find themselves at customs being constantly referred to secondary examination.  There, they are often told by the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA“) that their referral to secondary examination was the mandatory result of an enforcement flag being on their file.

Referral to secondary examination is time consuming.  Unnecessary referrals are a burden on both travellers and CBSA.  Because of this, CBSA was traditionally quite facilitative when it came to individuals requesting that an enforcement flag on their file be removed.  As a supervisor from the CBSA explained to me in an e-mail, enforcement flag removal works as follows:

The flag removal process doesn’t delete information, it merely closes the connection between the immigration database and the integrated system on the primary inspection line on that specific client.  The process is not visible to the naked eye – I use this analogy:

You get a lamp for a wedding present from “her” mom. You hate it. It’s a motion sensor lamp and it is hardwired into the wall. You can’t get rid of it, you can’t unplug it, you can’t take the light bulb out but you want the thing to stop lighting up every time you walk by. So, you unscrew the light bulb just enough that it doesn’t make contact. It’s still there, it’s still safe but it won’t ever light up again.

That’s what the flag removal does… we leave everything in place, but alter it slightly so that when the client shows up at the primary line, his name doesn’t light up!

As evidenced from the above e-mail, individuals could traditionally  e-mail the CBSA directly to ask that the enforcement flag be removed.  The CBSA almost always responded favourably within 48 hours.   It was excellent customer service.

While the process is a bit more cumbersome than before, it is still possible to request that an enforcement flag be removed before an individual attempts to enter Canada.

Border service officers are extremely busy.  It is very unlikely that many officers who want to help an individual remove an enforcement flag on their file will be able to take the time to make a written request to their supervisor.  The disadvantage for an officer in making a flag removal request (increased delays and a resulting increased workload for the officer’s co-workers) will almost always outweigh the benefit (that at some point in the future a different officer won’t have to deal with the unnecessary referral).

As an aside, considering that an individual border officer has the ability to deny someone entry to Canada, it is surprising that they don’t have the ability to quickly remove an enforcement flag.


Supreme Court Clarifies Dangerous Driving Law

The Supreme Court of Canada in 2012 clarified the law regarding what constitutes dangerous driving under the Criminal Code.  The decision, R v. Roy, has implications for people who may be inadmissible to Canada for criminality.  Indeed, in Jolly v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal Court of Canada affirmed that it will be a reviewable error if visa officers do not assess criminal equivalency for dangerous driving based on the mens rea standard articulated in Roy.

Section 249 of the Criminal Code provides that:

249. (1) Every one commits an offence who operates

(a) a motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place;

In R v. Roy, the Supreme Court was noted that (emphasis added):

It is, therefore, critically important to ensure that the fault requirement for dangerous driving has been established.  Failing to do so unduly extends the reach of the criminal law and wrongly brands as criminals those who are not morally blameworthy.  The distinction between a mere departure, which may support civil liability, and the marked departure required for criminal fault is a matter of degree.  The trier of fact must identify how and in what way the departure from the standard goes markedlybeyond mere carelessness.

Accordingly, the actus reus of s. 249 of the Criminal Code is driving in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place.  The focus of the actus reus inquiry is on the risks created by the accused’s manner of driving, not the consequences.

The mens rea for the offence is a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same circumstances.  Simple carelessness, to which even the most prudent drivers may occasionally succumb, does not meet the mens rea requirement.

Finally, even where the manner of driving is a marked departure from normal driving, s. 249 requires that the dangerous driving be a result of the marked departure from the norm.