• Borderlines Podcast Episode #46 – An Interview with Sergio Marchi, Canada’s Immigration Minister from 1993-1995

    Last Updated on February 19, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    Sergio Marchi was Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from 1993-1995.
    3:00 – Does someone keep the Minister title their whole life? 4:50 – What was the political consensus regarding Canadian immigration at the end of the 1980s? How did the Reform Party impact things? 8:00 – The mix of immigrants between economic, family and humanitarian immigrants. 11:15 – What dictates whether IRCC meets its level targets? 14:30 – The Brian Mulroney government was considering moving immigration under Public Safety. Under Sergio Marchi it instead became it’s on Ministry. What prompted this? 17:30 – Canadian attitudes to refugee resettlements and misconceptions. 20:45 – Sources of resistance to refugee resettlement. Resettled refugees vs asylum seekers. 23:00 – Changes that Minister Marchi made to the refugee determination process. 25:00 – What was Minister Marchi’s approach to intervening on specific cases? When would Minister Marchi help Members of Parliament on constituent files? Did it matter which political party the MP was from? 32:00 – The impact of a police officer who was shot by an illegal immigrant on deportation policy. 36:00 – Whether the Canada Border Services Agency should be under the immigration umbrella. 37:30 – What Minister Marchi considers to be his main accomplishments and the implementation of the right of landing fee. 45:00 – Minister Marchi’s push to remove the Queen from the citizenship oath.
  • Borderlines Podcast Episode 45 – Spousal Sponsorship Delays and Refusals, with Chantal Dube and Syed Farhan Ali

    Last Updated on February 19, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    Syed Farhan Ali shares his Canadian immigration story. During the time that his spousal sponsorship application was in process he was denied temporary entry to Canada, missed the birth of his first child and missed her first steps. He recently arrived in Canada after a three year application process. Chantal Dube is a Spokesperson for Spousal Sponsorship Advocates, a group with more than 5,000 members in Canada that argues for reforms to the family reunification process.  

    3:15 Said tells the story of his spousal sponsorship application. His application took 34 months to process. During the processing of his application Canada denied his visitor visa applications. He missed the birth of his children and their first steps, although he was able to reunite with his wife during brief trips to the United States, which did grant him a visitor visa.

    21:00 We discuss the refusal of temporary resident visas for people with spousal sponsorship applications in process, people with frequent travel histories, people with American multiple entry visas, and judicial reviews.

    25:00 How long a judicial review takes.

    29:50 Assessing genuineness in a spousal sponsorship application, and the distinction between “low risk and high risk” in the checklists.
    33:00 The strange quirk in the Family Class where people have to prove that their relationship is genuine but immigrants and foreign workers do not. The same is true for work permits, where the spouses of Canadians cannot apply for work permits from abroad, but the spouses of foreign workers can.

    38:00 What are major issues that Sponsorship Advocates seeing?

    39:45 What things can trigger genuineness concerns?

    45:00 Processing times and approval rates.

    55:00 Preventing abuse.

    1:03 Is an overzealous hunt for marriage fraud in individual applications the solution to marriage fraud, or are there other measures that can be taken?
  • Delays in Claiming Asylum

    Last Updated on February 15, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    The Federal Court decision in Calderon Garcia v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 412 sets out the legal principles regarding a delay in claiming asylum. It states:

    The Applicants assert that the Board erred in rejecting their claim based solely on the delay in claiming and a lack of supporting documentation. However, this position is not supported by the Board’s decision or related jurisprudence.

    Delay in making a refugee claim “is not a decisive factor in itself” but it is a “relevant element which the tribunal may take into account in assessing both the statements and the actions and deeds of a claimant” (Huerta v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 157 NR 225, [1993] FCJ no 271 (CA)). It is reasonable to expect that the Applicants would make a claim at the first possible opportunity (see Jeune v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 835, [2009] FCJ no 965 at para 15).

    Recent jurisprudence also suggests that while the delay itself is not determinative, it “may, in the right circumstances, constitute sufficient grounds upon which to dismiss a claim” (Duarte v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 988, [2003] FCJ no 1259 at para 14). Absent a satisfactory explanation for the delay, it “can be fatal to such claim, even where the credibility of an applicant’s claims has not otherwise been challenged” (Velez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 923, [2011] FCJ no 1138 at para 28).

    While the Board implied that the nineteen month delay in this instance would be fatal to the claims, it proceeded to raise several other issues associated with the Applicants’ credibility, notably evasive testimony and the lack of corroborating documents. It is evident from the remainder of the decision that the delay was a significant factor, but hardly the only basis for the negative credibility findings. The Board stressed that there were “cumulative reasons” for its conclusions regarding the Applicants.

    As a consequence, the Applicants’ reference to Juan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 809, [2006] FCJ no 1022 at para 11 is of limited assistance. In that case, Justice Eleanor Dawson faulted the Board because its “finding with respect to delay is, by itself, an insufficient basis for maintaining its denial of the claim.” In contrast, the Board’s issue with the Applicants’ story was the delay in conjunction with other relevant factors. In addition, more recent jurisprudence referred to above, suggests there are certain circumstances when the delay would be fatal to the claim.

  • Applying for a Permit When Country Conditions Are Not Good

    Last Updated on February 15, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    It is generally regarded as difficult for people who are from countries with bad home country conditions to apply for permits.  Hamad v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 336 is an example of how to put together an application that can overcome these issues. Background When he applied, Mr. Hamad lived in Benghazi, Libya, with Ms. Mahmoud and their four children who were all under the age of ten.  They were all Libyan citizens.  In 2011, Mr. Hamad applied to study in Canada at George Brown College in a business administration-accounting program.

    Mr. Hamad had two brothers living in Libya.  His third brother was a Canadian citizen who lived in Toronto and who testified that he was committed to supporting and financially assisting his brother’s family during their stay in Canada.  Mr. Hamad had previously traveled to Egypt, and in his application stated that he had visited his brother in Canada in 1991, on a visitor’s visa valid from January 24, 1991 to July 23, 1991, and that he left Canada before the expiry date.

    The family had no debts, had a home, an orchard and a well in Libya.  Mr. Hamad also owned a transport truck and an interest in a building supply store.  He was the Head of Teaching Staff Human Resources, Faculty of Agriculture, Garyounis University in Benghazi, and his wife was a teacher.  Both of them arranged for leaves of absence from their jobs while in Canada.


    IRCC refused the application.  The refusal was because the officer was not satisfied that the family would return to Libya after their visit.  In reaching this view, the officer examined their travel history; their purpose for the visit; family ties in Egypt, Libya and Canada; employment prospects in Libya; and incentives to return.

    The relevant portion of the decision stated:

    …letter from representative stating Libya “is a country experienceing [sic] sever [sic] instability. The normal patterns of life for its poulation [sic] have been disrupted and it is not possible to discoun [sic] the risk of harm. By coming to Canada for several years to study Mr. Hamad can ensure that his children are safe adn [sic] settled.” and “It is not possible, of course, to predict the outcome of the conflict in Libya…”, “Should the conditions in the country worsen rather than improve in the next several years, then Mr. Hamad would take legal and appropriate steps to retain his status in Canada until it is resolved…” Evidence of funds:- stat dec from brother, employment letter, Notice of assessment showing funds of $1,360,147 in 2011 – company docs for building materials company, vehicle, real estate docs I am not satisfied that the applicants meet the requirements for a temporary resident visa based on the applicants’ travel history (only limited travel to Egypt in ppts, no documentation given of other travel, purpose for visit (reps letter states his decision to pursue studies in CDA was based on the unstable situation in Libya), family ties in Egypt/Libya and Canada (while family is travelling to CDA), limited employment prospects in Libya (although PA and spouse state they are employed, current situation in Libya is very unstable and future employment is not certain) and weak incentives to return (rep. letter states PA and family will seek to stay in CDA as long as the situation in Libya remains unstable). Applicants lack strong ties which would ensure return after visit as per R179(b).

    The Decision

    The Officer set aside the refusal. First, Justice Zinn determined that the officer noted only Mr. Hamad’s limited travel to Egypt but completely disregarded or ignored his travel to Canada in 1991 and the fact that he returned to Libya before the expiry of his Canadian visa.

    Second, Justice zinn the officer’s conclusion that the applicants’ ties to Libya were weak was unreasonable and not supported by the record.

    Third, the officer’s finding of limited future employment in Libya resulting from the current instability was speculative, and an unreasonable conclusion not supported by the record.

    Fourth, and most importantly, Justice Zinn held that:

    the officer’s statement that “the family will seek to stay in [Canada] as long as situation in Libya remains unstable” mischaracterized the statements made in the application.  What the letter from the applicants’ counsel states is that the applicants, although expecting the situation to improve, would take all legal steps to remain in Canada if the conditions in Libya worsened but that they would not remain in Canada without status.  It reads as follows:

    He has every expectation that the country will stabilize, as it cannot continue as it is at present.  He wants to return when he completes his course and contribute to the development of the country.  Should the conditions in the country worsen rather than improve in the next several years, then Mr. Hamad would take legal and appropriate steps to retain his status in Canada until it is resolved. Please be assured that he has no intention, with a wife and four children, of attempting to remain without status in Canada.

    It is also of note that the visa was requested for a three year period ending in 2014.  The officer made his decision at a time the citizens of Libya were attempting, with the support of the international community, to oust Muammar Gaddafi.  The danger of the officer’s speculation as to the country conditions some three years in the future is shown by the fact that since then, Muammar Gaddafi has been ousted and killed, and although the current administration has issues, the stability in Libya has significantly improved.

    Justice Zinn’s statement should be useful in both future temporary resident visa applications and judicial reviews.

  • Inadmissibility for Being a Danger to Canada

    Last Updated on February 9, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    Section 34(1)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the “IRPA”) provides that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for being a danger to the security of Canada. Standard of Proof Section 33 of the IRPA provides that the facts which can give rise to an inadmissibility under IRPA s. 34(1)(d) include facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur. In Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard requires something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities and that reasonable grounds will exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information. Requirements In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, the Supreme Court stated:

    While the phrase “danger to the security of Canada” must be interpreted flexibly, and while courts need not insist on direct proof that the danger targets Canada specifically, the fact remains that to return (refouler) a refugee under s. 53(1)(b) to torture requires evidence of a serious threat to national security.  To suggest that something less than serious threats founded on evidence would suffice to deport a refugee to torture would be to condone unconstitutional application of the Immigration Act.  Insofar as possible, statutes must be interpreted to conform to the Constitution.  This supports the conclusion that while “danger to the security of Canada” must be given a fair, large and liberal interpretation, it nevertheless demands proof of a potentially serious threat.

    These considerations lead us to conclude that a person constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada, whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact that the security of one country is often dependent on the security of other nations.  The threat must be “serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible.

    This definition of “danger to the security of Canada” does not mean that Canada is unable to deport those who pose a risk to individual Canadians, but not the country.  A different provision, the “danger to the public” provision, allows the government to deport those who pose no danger to the security of the country per se  — those who pose a danger to Canadians, as opposed to a danger to Canada — provided they have committed a serious crime.  Moreover, if a refugee is wanted for crimes in a country that will not torture him or her on return, the government may be free to extradite him or her to face those charges, whether or not he or she has committed crimes in Canada.

    In Hosseini v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2018 FC 171, Justice O’Reilly stated that in order to find someone inadmissible under IRPA s. 34(1)(d) there needs to be evidence that a person has done something, or might do something, that supports the conclusion on dangerousness. Temporal Aspect In Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122, the Federal Court of Appeal stated:

    The scope of application of this section is governed by the rules of interpretation found in section 33. Unless otherwise provided, the facts that constitute inadmissibility include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur. Section 33 covers past, present and future facts. Therefore, there is no requirement under the combined effect of sections 33 and 34 that the danger to the security of Canada be current in order to be inadmissible on security grounds.

    As such, pursuant to the decision in Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 89, it is not necessary for purposes of an inadmissibility finding that the danger posed by the person be current.
  • Statistics on Asylum Claimants

    Last updated on February 14th, 2021

    Last Updated on February 14, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    In this page I will be posting assorted statistics on asylum claims that I find interesting. 1) In 2010 the rate of asylum claimants claiming social assistance was 84% in Ontario, 79% in Quebec, 57% in BC, and 48% in BC. 2) Interesting chart showing asylum claimants based on country of citizenship and province of claim in 2013-14. 3) Charts Showing the Increase in Claims from Nigeria
  • Extensions of Time and Judicial Review

    Last Updated on January 29, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    Section 72(2)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides that a judicial review shall be filed within 15 days of a matter arising in Canada and 60 days on a matter arising outside of Canada. Rule 6(2) of the Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, S.O.R./93‑22 provides that a request for an extension of time shall be determined at the same time, and on the same materials, as the application for leave. In Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 93, Justice Bell affirmed that extension request determinations should not be left to the judicial review but rather addressed at leave.  He further noted:

    Having expressed my opinion regarding the approach to be employed, I will, nonetheless, decide the question of the extension of time. Time limits have a purpose. One of their clear purposes is to ensure evidence does not go stale. Another is undoubtedly, to ensure defendants or respondents can know with some degree of certainty the extent of potential claims outstanding against them. Given these and other considerations, the Courts have developed an objective and balanced approach to when motions for extensions of time will be granted. Generally, the moving party must demonstrate: a) a continuing intention to pursue the application; b) that the application has some merit; c) that no prejudice arises from the delay; and d) that a reasonable explanation for the delay exists. The underlying principle is that justice, according to law, must be done: Grewal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 2 FC 263 (FCA), 63 N.R. 106; Patel v. Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 670, [2011] F.C.J. No. 860 at para.12; Semenduev v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 70, 68 A.C.W.S. (3d) 916; Canada (AG) v Hennelly, [1999] F.C.J. No. 846, 244 N.R. 399 (FCA); Canada (MHRD) v Hogervost, 2007 FCA 41, [2007] F.C.J. No. 37; and Kiflom v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 205, 315 A.C.W.S. (3d) 138.

    In Singh Justice Bell held that an extension of time should not be granted in situations where the delay was not the result of an unanticipated or unexpected event, and especially in situations where prejudice to the visa officer would exist. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a visa officer not being able to remember the specifics of a file.
  • Refusal to Process a Labour Market Impact Assessment

    Last Updated on January 24, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    A Labour Market Impact Assessment (a “LMIA“) is an assessment by the Department of Employment and Social Development Canada (“ESDC“) that the hiring of a foreign worker will have a positive, neutral or negative impact on Canada’s labour market. An LMIA is often a requirement to hire a foreign worker. There are certain situations in which ESDC will refuse to issue a LMIA. This effectively precludes employers from utilizing the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (the “TFWP“). The Sex Industry  Regulations 183(b.1) and 196.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (the “IRPR”) provides that temporary residents are prohibited from entering into an employment agreement, or extending the term of an employment agreement, with an employer who, on a regular basis, offers striptease, erotic dance, escort services or erotic massages. Regulation 200(3)(g.1) of the IRPR further provides that work permits cannot be issued to workers who intend to work for employers who, on a regular basis, offers striptease, erotic dance, escort services or erotic massages. Because of this, ESDC will not issue LMIAs to employers who regularly offer services in the sex industry (striptease, erotic dance, escort services or erotic massage). Ineligilibity List Employers who hire temporary workers may be inspected to make sure  they meet their responsibilities as an employer under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program or International Mobility Program. If an employer is found non-compliant, they can receive either a monetary penalty or a ban from hiring temporary workers for a specified period of time. As such, ESDC will not issue LMIAs to employers who are on the Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada ineligibility list which includes employers who:
    • have been found non-compliant as result of an employer compliance review
    • have been banned from the Temporary Foreign Worker Program because non-compliance was discovered during an inspection
    • are in default of payment of an administrative monetary penalty.
    Certain Positions in Accommodation and Food Services and Retail Trade Sectors ESDC will aos refuse to process LMIAs for certain positions in the accommodation and food services and retail trade sectors if all of the following factors apply. First, the position must be in an economic region with an unemployment rate of 6% or higher.  The areas where this applies can normally be found here. Due to COVID-19, all economic regions in Canada are considered to have unemployment rates of at least 6% or above. Second, the position must be in the Accommodation and Food Services Sector or the Retail Trades Sector. These are North American Industrial Classification System (“NAICS“) code 72 and NAICS codes 44 to 45. Third, the position must be under the National Occupational Classification codes 6541, 6611, 6622, 6711, 6721, 6731, 6732, 6733, 7611 and 8612. Low-Wage Positions Above the Cap ESDC will refuse to process LMIA applications that are Low-Wage if the employer excees their cap on the proportion of low-wage temporary foreign workers for the same positions at the same work location. Alberta As per the ESDC website, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all new and pending LMIAs for positions in Alberta must be on the a list of exempt occupations to be eligible for processing. Until further notice, we are refusing to process LMIAs if the position you are looking to fill is not listed, unless they qualify for exemption, which include the Global Talent Stream. Prior to COVID-19, ESDC’s policies with regards to refusing to process LMIA applications for Alberta were as follows: ESDC Alberta
  • Joint Submissions at the Immigration Appeal Division

    Last Updated on January 13, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    It is not uncommon for the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) to consent to an Immigration Appeal Division (the “IAD”) appeal, and for the applicant and CBSA to make joint submissions. On occassion, the IAD will not accept the joint submissions. There are also occassions where the IAD may signal, either expressly or impliedly that a certain matter is not at issue, while it in fact may be or become an issue. The jurisprudence on this is as follows. In Velauthar v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FCJ No 425 (CA), a panel advised counsel before submissions that the only issue was whether the persecution the claimant feared was based on a Convention ground. This implied that credibility was not in issue, so the parties did not address credibility in their submissions. The Federal Court of Appeal found it to be a “gross denial of natural justice” for the panel to then make an adverse determination on grounds of credibility.”  The Federal Court of Canada has applied Velauthar in cases where a tribunal directly or by implication gave the misleading impression that a matter or issue was resolved. At the same time, the Federal Court of Canada in Fong v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 1134, ruled that the IAD is entitled to reject a joint submission so long as it provides reasons for so doing and if hte process was procedurally fair.  However, the IAD must give serious consideration to the joint submission.  Several Federal Court decisions have compared joint submissions at the IAD with joint submissions in criminal sentencing. In Grewal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1186 Justice McHaffie provided a helpful summary of the jurisprudence applying Fong. He wrote:

    Both parties referred to case law arising from the context of a joint submission to the IAD regarding a stay of a removal order. That case law establishes that a joint submission on a stay is not binding on the IAD, but should be given serious consideration: Nguyen v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16488 (FC) at para 14; Malfeo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 193 at paras 12–19; Hussain v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 334 at paras 20–21; Fong at para 31.

    In Nguyen, Justice Lemieux of this Court referred to and adopted the reasoning in criminal cases relating to joint submissions on sentencing. He noted that while immigration removals were a different context than criminal sentencing, there were analogies between the factors relevant to a stay and the matters taken into account in sentencing: Nguyen at paras 10–14. He concluded that the then Appeal Division of the IRB had erred in failing to explain why joint submissions on a five-year stay were not endorsed: Nguyen at paras 9, 15.

    Justice Lemieux applied the same principles a decade later in Malfeo, again recognizing the differences and similarities between stays of removal by the IAD and criminal sentencing: Malfeo at paras 12–16. The Court found that the IAD erred in rejecting a joint submission without asking for further submissions from the parties, and in failing to give serious consideration to the joint submission by rejecting it in a perfunctory manner without analysis: Malfeo at paras 17–20.

    The IAD’s rejection of a joint submission was accepted in Fong. There, when advised that the parties had a joint recommendation for disposition, the IAD expressly stated that the parties could make their submission but that the IAD was “going to have to think on it very seriously,” while also interjecting with comments that showed their concerns with the submission: Fong at paras 27–29. Citing Nguyen and Malfeo, Justice Zinn found that the IAD was entitled to reject the joint submission “so long as it provided reasons for doing so,” which it had done: Fong at paras 31–32; see also similar results in Tuel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 223 at paras 19–23 and Doe v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 518 at paras 44–49.

    The principle in Fong has also been applied beyond the context of stays of removal. In Saroya, Justice Mosley applied it to an appeal based on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds, finding that the IAD could reject the joint submission “if it provides reasons for doing so”: Saroya v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 428 at paras 5–6, 20–21. In Tung, Justice McDonald found the principle applicable in the context of a cessation application to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), confirming that the RPD may consider other grounds for cessation even though the Minister and applicant had identified only one ground for cessation: Tung v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1224 at paras 26–32.

    Justice Campbell expanded on the nature of joint submissions and their rejection in Al-Abdi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 262. Adopting the discussion from Malfeo, he emphasized at paragraph 10 the difference between rejecting a joint submission and simply rejecting one party’s argument:

    There is a difference between an argument advanced by one of the parties to a litigation, and a joint submission presented by Counsel for both parties. An argument may be rejected by providing a supportable reason. A joint submission is not an argument; it is an agreement between the parties which goes directly to removing issues in the litigation from determination. This is why the law has established the principle that a joint submission must not be disregarded. A finding as to whether regard was paid to a joint submission is case dependent. That is, on judicial review an evaluation must be made of the nature of the impact of the joint submission on the person or persons directly affected, which in turn defines the quality of regard expected of the decision-maker to whom the joint submission is directed. The issue in each individual case is whether the joint submission was fairly regarded.

    [Emphasis added.]

    I agree with Justice Campbell’s comments regarding the nature of a joint submission in this context. It is to be recalled that, as the Minister underscored in submissions, the IAD hears matters in an adversarial context: Chieu at para 82. Such a context inherently involves litigation decisions being made by the adversarial parties that may have an impact on the outcome of the case. It may also involve parties conceding or reaching agreement on particular issues so as to avoid needing to litigate every issue. Such concessions and agreements improve the efficiency of the litigation process. There is some indication in the record of this proceeding that such discussion occurred, with counsel for the parties discussing the extent and nature of the evidence on Mr. Grewal’s understanding of marriage, and the order of questioning of Mr. Singh.

    Grewal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) was ultimately an example where the Federal Court found that the IAD not accepting a joint submission was procedrually unfair. The Court stated:

    The IAD’s indication that Mr. Grewal need only proceed with examination of Mr. Singh if the Minister did not consent precludes such reliance, as it gave a direct signal to counsel that the evidence was not required. Nor does the fact that the IAD reserved its decision change the situation. While the IAD’s indication that it would let the parties know “what that [decision] will be” might be taken as a statement that the IAD was contemplating an adverse finding on genuineness, this statement was made after the hearing was effectively over, after the decision was reserved, and without a reasonable opportunity in the circumstances for Mr. Grewal’s counsel to then argue that if the IAD was going to make an adverse decision, Mr. Singh’s further evidence should first be heard.

  • LMIA Working Conditions

    Last Updated on January 12, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

    The Temporary Foreign Worker Manual states the following about working conditions. Working Condition