Last Updated on February 9, 2021 by Steven Meurrens

Section 34(1)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the “IRPA”) provides that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for being a danger to the security of Canada.

Standard of Proof

Section 33 of the IRPA provides that the facts which can give rise to an inadmissibility under IRPA s. 34(1)(d) include facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur.

In Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard requires something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities and that reasonable grounds will exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information.

Requirements

In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, the Supreme Court stated:

While the phrase “danger to the security of Canada” must be interpreted flexibly, and while courts need not insist on direct proof that the danger targets Canada specifically, the fact remains that to return (refouler) a refugee under s. 53(1)(b) to torture requires evidence of a serious threat to national security.  To suggest that something less than serious threats founded on evidence would suffice to deport a refugee to torture would be to condone unconstitutional application of the Immigration Act.  Insofar as possible, statutes must be interpreted to conform to the Constitution.  This supports the conclusion that while “danger to the security of Canada” must be given a fair, large and liberal interpretation, it nevertheless demands proof of a potentially serious threat.

These considerations lead us to conclude that a person constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada, whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact that the security of one country is often dependent on the security of other nations.  The threat must be “serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible.

This definition of “danger to the security of Canada” does not mean that Canada is unable to deport those who pose a risk to individual Canadians, but not the country.  A different provision, the “danger to the public” provision, allows the government to deport those who pose no danger to the security of the country per se  — those who pose a danger to Canadians, as opposed to a danger to Canada — provided they have committed a serious crime.  Moreover, if a refugee is wanted for crimes in a country that will not torture him or her on return, the government may be free to extradite him or her to face those charges, whether or not he or she has committed crimes in Canada.

In Hosseini v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2018 FC 171, Justice O’Reilly stated that in order to find someone inadmissible under IRPA s. 34(1)(d) there needs to be evidence that a person has done something, or might do something, that supports the conclusion on dangerousness.

Temporal Aspect

In Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122, the Federal Court of Appeal stated:

The scope of application of this section is governed by the rules of interpretation found in section 33. Unless otherwise provided, the facts that constitute inadmissibility include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur. Section 33 covers past, present and future facts. Therefore, there is no requirement under the combined effect of sections 33 and 34 that the danger to the security of Canada be current in order to be inadmissible on security grounds.

As such, pursuant to the decision in Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 89, it is not necessary for purposes of an inadmissibility finding that the danger posed by the person be current.