Last Updated on August 12, 2015 by Steven Meurrens
I have previously written about the upcoming Supreme Court of Canada decision in Jeyakannan Kanthasamy v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in which the Supreme Court will address the following question:
What is the scope of the humanitarian & compassionate discretion in s. 25 of theImmigration and Refugee Protection Act: is it limited to cases of “unusual and undeserved, or disproportionate hardship”, reserved for exceptional cases, and restricted by requiring that the hardship be ‘personalized’ or that the person’s establishment be greater than what would ordinarily be expected?
The Federal Court recently certified a question of general importance which shows both how restrictive the current principles of humanitarian & compassionate considerations can be, as well as why the Federal Court feels that such an approach is necessary.
Joseph v. Canada
In Joseph v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 661, the Federal court certified the following three questions:
1) Is evidence of kidnapping and similar violent criminal conduct relevant to a hardship analysis under section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act?
2) Is it incorrect or unreasonable to require, as part of an H&C, analysis that an applicant establish that the circumstances of hardship that he or she will face on removal are not those generally faced by others in their country of origin?
3) If the answer to question 2) is no, can the conditions in the country of origin support a reasoned inference as to the challenges any applicant would face on return to his or her country of origin, and thereby provide an evidentiary foundation for a meaningful, individualized analysis of hardships that will affect the applicant personally and directly as required by Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113, 459 NR 367, leave to appeal to the SCC granted,  SCCA No 309?
The issue essentially boils down to whether the personalized vs. generalized risk determination that is determinative in protected persons applications is also a factor to consider in humanitarian & compassionate consideration requests. There has been some divergence on the matter. In Diabate v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 129, for example, Justice Gleason stated:
The officer’s role in an H&C analysis is to assess whether an individual would face “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship” if required to apply for permanent residence outside of Canada. It is both incorrect and unreasonable to require, as part of that analysis, that an applicant establish that the circumstances he or she will face are not generally faced by others in their country of origin. Rather, the frame of analysis for H&C consideration has to be that of the individual him or herself, which involves consideration of whether the hardship of leaving Canada and returning to the country of origin would be undue, undeserved or disproportionate.
While claims for humanitarian and compassionate relief under section 25 must be supported by evidence, there are circumstances where the conditions in the country of origin are such that they support a reasoned inference as to the challenges a particular applicant would face on return to Niger. This is not speculation, rather it is a reasoned inference, of a non – speculative nature, as to the hardship an individual would face, and thus provides an evidentiary foundation for a meaningful, individualized analysis as required by [Kanthasamy].
However, as Justice Annis noted in Joseph, this can create a scenario in which every H&C application from a country in which there is a generalized likelihood of hardship must succeed. He wrote:
As I understand Justice Shore’s reasons, there is a general policy that prevents entire populations of foreign nationals, or large groups of them, from claiming permanent residency in Canada as a right. Logically, because general country conditions by definition apply to all members (or subsets of members) of society, it is not enough to rely simply on being a member of society, all of whom are subject to a risk of unusual hardship from these conditions. If this were the case, “every H&C application made by a national of a country with problems would have to be assessed positively”
Accordingly, the principle has been adopted that permanent residency may only be granted to individuals based on their personal circumstances, and not based simply on the evidence of those conditions generally faced by all the population in their country of origin. If, as in this case, only evidence of general conditions is put forward, the claim will be defeated for lack of sufficient evidence demonstrating exceptional personal circumstances that cause those conditions to directly affect the applicant.
I recognize that this requirement is similar to the requirement under section 97 for an applicant to demonstrate personalized targeting where her or relies on general country conditions, as described above in Guerrero (see also: Wan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 124,243 ACWS (3d) 955; Gomez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1093, 397 FTR 170; Guifarro v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 182, 198 ACWS (3d) 470; Pineda v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 365, 65 Imm LR (3d) 275). However, I do not see how any allegation of a generalized risk that meets the requirement to apply personally, directly and exceptionally to the applicant can be otherwise construed without avoiding the result that “every H&C application made by a national of a country with problems would have to be assessed positively” (Lalane at para 1).
Given the divergent Federal Court decisions on the matter, it is now up to the Federal Court of Appeal to decide.
Of course, by the time it does so, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Kanthasamy may change the H&C factors and principles entirely.