Last updated on July 3rd, 2020
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) created a new test for determining complicity in Article 1F(a) exclusion cases.
Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides that:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, a crime against humanity is committed when each of the following four elements is satisfied:
- An enumerated proscribed act was committed (this involves showing that the accused committed the criminal act and had the requisite guilty state of mind for the underlying act);
- The act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
- The attack was directed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons; and
- The person who committed the proscribed act knew of the attack and knew or took the risk that his or her act comprised a part of that attack.
The issue that Ezokola addressed is how broad Article 1F(a) is. It if it interpreted too narrowly, then Canada risks creating safe havens for perpetrators of international crimes. If it is read too broadly, then the humanitarian aims of the 1951 Refugee Convention would be imperilled.Read more ›
Last updated on October 12th, 2019
The Supreme Court of Canada has “clarified” the elements of the duress defence. The defence is important because it can affect admissibility.
For example, in Guerra Diaz v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 88, the Federal Court of Court determined that the Immigration and Refugee Board improperly applied the test of whether duress applied, and ordered a new hearing by a different member.
Duress and Inadmissibility
It is basically trite law that where there is duress, then a person does not have the mens rea do either commit a crime or be a member in a group that renders the individual inadmissible to Canada. In Jalloh v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 317, the Federal Court stated that:
In my view, it is preferable to consider the evidence of membership along with the evidence of coercion in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the person genuinely was a member of the group. One way of looking at this issue is to regard evidence of duress as defeating the mens rea of membership (Thiyagarajah v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 339). Accordingly, evidence relating to duress must be considered along with the evidence relating to membership in deciding whether the person really was a member of the group or, rather, was motivated by self-preservation.
In sum, a person cannot be considered to be a member of a group when his or her involvement with it is based on duress. At a minimum, a member is someone who intentionally carries out acts in furtherance of the group’s goals.Read more ›
On March 1, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC“) in R v. J.F., clarified the elements of the offence of conspiracy. The decision has immigration implications because people who have been convicted of conspiracy may be inadmissible to Canada.
Section 465 of Canada’s Criminal Code criminalizes the offence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a form of inchoate liability. In other words, the actual result of the conspiracy need not occur for someone to be convicted under s. 465. For example, a person can be convicted of “conspiracy to commit murder” even if the murder does not occur. Furthermore, members in a conspiracy need not personally commit, or intend to commit, the offence which each has agreed should be committed. Any degree of assistance in the furtherance of the unlawful object can lead to a finding of membership as long as agreement to a common plan can be inferred and the requisite mental state has been established.
Aiding or abetting the formation of an agreement between conspirators amounts to aiding or abetting the principals in the commission of the conspiracy. Party liability is limited, however, to cases where the accused aids or abets the initial formation of the agreement, or aids or abets a new member to join a pre‑existing agreement. The SCC ruled that acts that further the unlawful object of a conspiracy are not an element of the offence of conspiracy. Aiding or abetting the furtherance of the unlawful object does not establish aiding or abetting the principal with any element of the offence of conspiracy. However, the SCC noted that where a person, with knowledge of a conspiracy, does or omits to do something for the purpose of furthering the unlawful object,Read more ›