On April 16, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada announced that it was reserving its decision in Jeyakannan Kanthasamy v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (“Kanthasamy”). When it is released, Kanthasamy may be the most significant immigration decision since Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).
As noted in the Appellant’s factum, the issue that the Supreme Court of Canada will be addressing is:
What is the scope of the humanitarian & compassionate discretion in s. 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: is it limited to cases of “unusual and undeserved, or disproportionate hardship”, reserved for exceptional cases, and restricted by requiring that the hardship be ‘personalized’ or that the person’s establishment be greater than what would ordinarily be expected?
As any immigration practitioner can confirm, if the Supreme Court of Canada broadens the current restrictive interpretation of humanitarian & compassionate considerations under s. 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA“) it would cause a monumental shift in the processing of immigration applications.
The Federal Court of Appeal Decision
In Kanthasamy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 802, the Federal Court certified the following question of general importance.
What is the nature of the risk, if any, to be assessed with respect to humanitarian and compassionate considerations under section 25 of IRPA, as amended by the Balanced Refugee Reform Act?
The Federal Court of Appeal answered as follows:
Matters such as well-founded fear of persecution, risk to life, and risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment – factors under sections 96 and 97 – may not be considered under subsection 25(1) by virtue of subsection 25(1.3).Read more ›
Last updated on March 18th, 2019
The Supreme Court of Canada in 2012 clarified the law regarding what constitutes dangerous driving under the Criminal Code. The decision, R v. Roy, has implications for people who may be inadmissible to Canada for criminality. Indeed, in Jolly v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal Court of Canada affirmed that it will be a reviewable error if visa officers do not assess criminal equivalency for dangerous driving based on the mens rea standard articulated in Roy.
Section 249 of the Criminal Code provides that:
249. (1) Every one commits an offence who operates
(a) a motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place;
In R v. Roy, the Supreme Court noted that (emphasis added):
It is, therefore, critically important to ensure that the fault requirement for dangerous driving has been established. Failing to do so unduly extends the reach of the criminal law and wrongly brands as criminals those who are not morally blameworthy. The distinction between a mere departure, which may support civil liability, and the marked departure required for criminal fault is a matter of degree. The trier of fact must identify how and in what way the departure from the standard goes markedlybeyond mere carelessness.
Accordingly, the actus reus of s.Read more ›
As the legal community continues to debate whether Bill C-49 is constitutional, the Supreme Court of Canada has indirectly touched upon the issue in Németh v. Canada, a decision about whether a refugee can be extradited to his/her country of origin to face charges. The answer is yes.Read more ›